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Since the late 1970s, the Chinese government has put forward a principle named ‘Set aside 
dispute and pursue joint development’. However, a joint development precedent does not 
exist that would assure the successful application of this principle between China and other 
countries with claims in South China Sea region. The possibility of joint development in the 
South China Sea faces the following major difficulties and challenges: a lack of political will, 
weak practical needs, island sovereignty disputes, ambiguities in various disputed maritime 
areas, and the interference of external forces. The award of the South China Sea arbitration 
case may exert a negative impact on joint development in this area. Though China and the 
Philippines are less likely to jointly develop the oil and gas resources in the South China 
Sea, with the improvement in Sino-Philippine relations and the further development of 
the relationship between China and ASEAN, as well as its member states, there is a strong 
possibility that the two countries will achieve cooperation and joint development in the fishery 
domain. Moreover, China is most likely to initiate the joint development with Indonesia, in 
the Natuna Islands sea area, the South China Sea.
Keywords: Sino-Philippine Arbitration Case, Joint Development, the South China Sea, United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
1. Introduction. In October 2013, China and Brunei published the Joint Statement 
Between the People’s Republic of China and Brunei Darussalam in which the two countries 
reiterated their political will to deepen bilateral relations through cooperation in various 
fields, and agreed to support relevant enterprises of the two countries to carry out joint 
exploration and exploitation of maritime oil and gas resources (Chinanews 2013). Subse-
quently, China and Vietnam issued the Joint Statement on Deepening the Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership of Cooperation Between China and Vietnam in the New Era (Xinhua-
net 2013). The two sides agreed to have a firm grasp on the course of bilateral relations 
and to set up three important mechanisms for their implementation, including a Working 
Group for Consultation on Maritime Joint Development. On the basis of easiness to diffi-
culty, and of a step-by-step principle, the negotiation for the boundary delimitation in the 
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Mouth of the Beibu Gulf (Gulf of Tonkin) made steadily progress and actively promoted 
the joint development of this maritime area.1 
In November 2014, Chinese President XI Jinping met respectfully with Hassanal, 
the Sultan of Brunei, and Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak who were attending the 
22nd APEC Informal Leadership Meeting. In this occasion, XI pointed out that China is 
willing to strengthen maritime cooperation with Brunei and to make concrete progress 
on joint development of the South China Sea as soon as possible; and that China and 
Malaysia should facilitate maritime cooperation and joint development in order to 
promote regional peace, stability and prosperity (Xinhua News 2014). Besides, The China-
Vietnam Joint Statement issued in November 2015, reaffirmed that ‘The two sides will 
steadily push forward the boundary delimitation negotiation on the Mouth of the Beibu 
Gulf and actively promote the joint development of this sea area; Meanwhile, the Working 
Group for the outer area of Gulf should advance the negotiations and continue to promote 
the maritime joint development under the Consultative Working Group, especially to 
strengthen cooperation in less-sensitive areas.’ (People’s official site 2015). Therefore, the 
issue of maritime joint development may become an important part of Chinese foreign 
relations in the very near future.
In September 2016, the relationship between China and ASEAN was further developed 
along with the Commemorative Summit of the 25th Anniversary of China-ASEAN 
Dialogue Relations (Joint Statement 2016). Moreover, Sino-Philippine relations turned 
a new page since Philippine President Duterte visited China in October 2016  (Yichun 
2016). In this context, is there a possibility that China and the Philippines could agree on 
joint development in the South China Sea? Furthermore, with which country could China 
cooperate first? Undoubtedly a study of these problems is of great value both theoretically 
and practically.
This paper is divided into seven parts. The introduction provides the background as 
well as the significance of the study. The second part elaborates the status quo of the joint 
development in the South China Sea. The third part contains the analysis of the dilemma 
and its relevant challenges. The fourth part discusses the influence of the Sino-Philippine 
Arbitration result on the South China Sea Joint Development. The fifth part explores the 
possibility of developing jointly the South China Sea between two states. Based on its 
precedent argumentation, the sixth part gives a prediction of China’s choice, pointing out 
that with which country China is most likely to take a leading joint development in South 
China Sea. The seventh part is the conclusion.
2.  Joint Development in the South China Sea: Current Situation. Various pro-
posed solutions for Joint Development in the South China Sea. State governments and 
scholars have proposed a number of different projects for this issue, principally including:
1) Valencia’s “A Spratly Solution” (Valencia 1994, 30). Under the precondition of de-
militarization and suspension of sovereignty, a multinational organization, called 
the Multilateral Spratly Development Authority, is constituted by states involved 
in the Spratly Islands dispute. This organization is not only responsible for the 
exploration and exploitation of resources in the disputed maritime waters and 
1  As early as October 2005, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and the Vietnam 
Petroleum Corporation signed “Framework Agreement of Oil and Gas Cooperation in Beibu Gulf ” in 
Hanoi. 
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to manage conflicts among maritime users of this region; but is also responsible 
for fisheries management, environmental preservation, and international cooper-
ation in scientific research and environmental protection of the region (Valencia 
1985, 211–254).
2) Triple Level Plan for South China Sea. Professor Kuen-chen FU proposed that in 
South China Sea, the islands are part of Chinese territory, the sovereignty of these 
islands and its 12 nm territorial sea belongs to China, so it cannot be jointly de-
veloped; However, the area outside these islands and reefs is the historical waters 
of China’s 1947 U-shaped Line, in this area, the joint development could be taken 
into consideration but in which China has priority; Finally, the whole South Chi-
na Sea (including the Gulf of Siam2) area that outside the U-Shaped Line should 
be fully and equally shared (Zhonghai 2013, 198–217).
3) Multi-party Negotiation. Chinese scholar YingMin AN pointed out that, the dis-
pute issues could be settled effectively and the exploitation of conflicting regions 
could be developed orderly only if the states involved in dispute could, bilaterally 
or multilaterally, equally participate and negotiate, and could formulate common-
ly an economic cooperation development model for the conflicted area (Yingmin, 
Tingting 2011, 110–115).
Practices concerning Joint Development in the South China Sea. As early as the 
end of the 1970s, the Chinese government put forward the principle of ‘Set aside dispute 
and pursue joint development’, trying to solve the islands sovereignty and maritime rights 
disputes between China and neighbouring countries (Zhenmin 2005, 18–23; Shicun 2007, 
1–10). Unfortunately, over 30 years, there does not yet exist successful instances of joint 
development based on this principle between China and her neighbours (Principled con-
sensus on the East China Sea issue 2008).3
Nevertheless, there does exist some joint-development practices in the South China 
Sea (Beckman et al 2013, 18–19; Becker-Weinberg 2014, 155–163). For instance, in the 
year of 1979, the Malaysian government and the Thailand government has concluded the 
Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and the Kingdom of Thailand on the 
Establishment of a Joint Authority for the Exploitation of the Resources in the Sea-Bed in a 
Defined Area of the Continental Shelf of the Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand.4 In 1990, 
the two governments adopted an Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the 
Government of the Kingdom of Thailand on the Constitution and other matters relating 
to the establishment of the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority 1990. Both sides achieved 
ultimately joint development of oil and gas resources in the Gulf of Thailand. Besides, 
with the aim of promoting bilateral joint development, Indonesia and Australia signed the 
Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Co-operation in an 
2 The Gulf of Thailand.
3 In 2005, China and North Korea concluded a Joint Development Agreement, it was China’s first 
joint development agreement. In June 2008, China and Japan reached a principled consensus on the East 
China Sea issue, both sides affirm that they will conduct cooperation in the transitional period prior to 
delimitation without prejudicing their respective legal positions; besides, the two sides set up a block for 
the joint development in the central eastern portion of the East China Sea. Moreover, Chinese enterprises 
welcome the participation of Japanese legal persons in the development of the existing oil and gas fields in 
Chunxiao in accordance with the relevant laws of China governing cooperation with foreign enterprises in 
the exploration and exploitation of offshore petroleum resources. 
4 Entered into Force 24 October 1979.
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Area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia of 11 Decem-
ber 1989 (International Law Materials 1990, 469–537). Additionally there was the Memo-
randum of Understanding Concerning the Continued Operation of the Treaty Between Aus-
tralia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area Between the 
Indonesian Province of East Timor and the Northern Australia, adopted between Australia 
and Indonesia (Australia-UNTAET 2000). 
Moreover, in 1992, Malaysia and Vietnam signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
between Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam for the Exploration and Exploita-
tion of Petroleum in a Defined Area of the Continental Shelf involving the Two Countries. 
In this case, the two sides agreed to limit the disputed area in a “block” of 1358  km². 
This “block”, served as the future joint operation area, is the foundation that ensured the 
smooth implementation of joint development (Hong Thao 2003, 147). Also in June 18, 
2001, Cambodia and Thailand reached a Memorandum of Understanding between Cam-
bodia and Thailand on the Area of Overlapping Maritime Claims to the Continental Shelf, 
and planned to execute Joint Development (Beckman 2013, 183). This agreement was 
unilaterally abolished by Thai National Assembly because of the tension between the two 
countries (Thai Cabinet agrees to revoke MoU 2009).
In March 16, 2009, Malaysia and Brunei signed the Exchange of Letters between Ma-
laysia Brunei Darussalam dated 16 March 2009  in order to promote joint development 
cooperation (Beckman 2013, 204).
It’s worth a mentioning that, in April 2005, A Tripartite Agreement on the Joint Seismic 
Undertaking in the Agreed Area in the South China, signed by the petroleum enterprises of 
China, the Philippines and Vietnam, is regarded as a historic and substantive step forward 
to the “Joint Development”, and is served as an important measure to the implementa-
tion of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (Zhenmin 2005, 
22). In addition, Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia have agreed in principle on the joint 
development in the Gulf of Thailand in 1999, despite that the size of “block” ready for co-
development is relatively small (Hong Thao 2003, 138).
Current Dilemma in Joint Development of the South China Sea. As mentioned 
above, scholars from different countries proposed a variety of theoretical solutions for 
the joint development issues in the South China Sea. Also in reality, some of the claimant 
states in the South China Sea have carried out successful joint development practices, but 
the South China Sea joint development is still facing the following difficulties and chal-
lenges (Zewei 2011, 70–75; Beckman et al 2013, 291–311).
Lack of political will. “The political will among the countries toward the joint de-
velopment is the key element to the success of the joint development negotiations” (Beck-
man et al 2013, 141; Yu 2007, 55). ‘As a politically motivated international cooperative 
operation, joint development is, no matter in its previous negotiations or in its subsequent 
implementation, indeed affected by the political will of both sides. For example, in the 
1981 The Jan Mayen Case (Iceland/Norway), the reason why two countries had been able 
to reach an agreement and make arrangements for the obvious benefit of Iceland was be-
cause Norway wanted to retain Iceland in NATO as an outpost against the Soviet Union’ 
(Penghong 1998, 96–108; Richardson 1988, 443). 
Similarly in the year of 2008, the China-Japan Principled Consensus on the East China 
Sea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2008) settled on the 
consistent and frequent political interaction between the two countries, and was related 
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closely to the successive visit of leaders of both sides. These visits were always described as 
‘ice-breaking’, ‘melting ice’, ‘spring’ and ‘warm spring’ (Jianjun 2009, 292).
However, in South China Sea, the relevant countries lacked the political will to devel-
op jointly. Although China and ASEAN countries signed the Declaration on the Conduct 
of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, this Declaration is not legally binding and lacks 
a punishment mechanism for the violation of its spirit.5
Weak practical needs. ‘International practice approves that joint development is 
based on realistic considerations, and possessed obvious functional characteristics’ (Jian-
guo 2006, 50). For instance, the Agreement between the Government of the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway 
relating to the Exploitation of the Frigg Field Reservoir and Transmission of gas therefrom 
to the United Kingdom of 10 May 1976 (Energy 1981, 1317–1324) was signed by United 
Kingdom and Norway in 1976 to enable the most expedient access to the oil and gas of 
North Sea in order to deal with the first global energy crisis (Zewei 2016, 27). Therefore, 
‘economic factors, such as the country’s urgent need for oil and gas resources, will firstly 
prompt the government to find ways and to get benefit from development without delay-
ing the development and utilization of resources due to delimitation negotiations that may 
even affect the state relations’ (Hui 1994, 90). Just as M. J. Valencia and Masahiro Miyoshi 
analyzed, that ‘perhaps the most important reason for countries to choose to exploit to-
gether, is out of a sense of urgency or obligation to protect their oil and gas deposits, and 
to maintain or strengthen relations with their neighbours’ (Valencia, Miyoshi 1986, 223). 
However, most of the disputed waters between China and the other claimants in the South 
China Sea are under the actual control, management or exploitation of these claimants. 
The actual representation of China and its development activities in these disputed areas 
are extremely limited, or even inexistent. This put China in an evidently disadvantageous 
position. Therefore, ‘in this situation, there is no necessity and urgency for the claimants 
to develop jointly the South China Sea with China’ (Zhiguo 2006, 203).
Islands’ sovereignty disputes. Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (hereinafter referred to as the LOSC) provides that rocks which can sustain 
human habitation or economic life on their own shall have exclusive economic zone or 
continental shelf. Therefore, the sovereignty of the island is very important. Based on the 
current international practices, the majority of joint development programs are launched 
in the overlapping maritime area, and in cases where an island sovereignty dispute does 
not exist (Zewei 2016, 99). Therefore, many scholars even believe that ‘a prerequisite for 
joint development is be able to resolve the relevant island’s sovereignty conflict’ (Jianguo 
2006, 209). However, in the South China Sea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei 
do exist sovereignty disputes over islands and rocks with China. Although according to 
the historical and jurisprudential basis that China has indisputable sovereignty over these 
islands, the relevant countries are reluctant to shelve disputes or to make concessions. 
Therefore, it’s quite difficult to launch joint development of this area. 
Ambiguity in various disputed maritime areas. An essential prerequisite for joint 
development is overlapping maritime areas (maritime zones) that are clearly recognized 
by both claimants (Zewei 2016. 28–29). However, the disputed area of the South China 
Sea is relatively vague. On the one hand, the maritime area to which states lay claim is not 
5 Similarly, Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC that signed by China and ASEAN countries 
is also a political statement. 
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clear. For example, the South China Sea dispute involves six countries and seven parties. 
Not only is the disputed sea area between two countries difficult to determine, but these 
disputes are also often related to three or more claimants. As Jalal, ambassador-at-large of 
Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said, ‘due to the ambiguity of the rights of the is-
lands and rocks in the LOSC, some claimed that the rock itself or the facilities established 
on reefs can have continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, which created multi-
ple overlapping claims among countries in South China Sea, the complexity made it more 
difficult to determine the disputed area” (Jianguo 2006, 182). On the other hand, China’s 
maritime claims are not specific. Although China has ratified the LOSC and promulgated 
the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and 
the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental 
Shelf, the Chinese Government only generally points out that China has undoubted sover-
eignty over the Spratly Islands and their surrounding waters; but the detailed scope of the 
territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf that China claimed 
in South China Sea is not clearly defined. Besides, the meaning of Chinese traditional 
Nine-dash line is not accurately and publicly explained. So it can be seen that it’s very dif-
ficult to delimitate the joint development zone and to launch the relevant work.
Interference of external forces. The interference of United States and other regional 
forces in the East China Sea and South China Sea issue makes things more complicated. 
This also, to some extent, disturbs the advancement of joint development (Zeming 2010, 
3). On the one hand, the South China Sea issue is evidently being internationalized and 
“multi-lateralized” (Zewei 2016, 94). On the other hand, in recent years Vietnam, the Phil-
ippines and Malaysia are more and more actively developing military and economic coop-
eration with the United States and Japan, aiming to contend against China.
1) The United States continues to uphold ‘Freedom of navigation’, and takes 
advantage of the disputes over territories in the South China Sea to improve its 
Asia-Pacific arrangement. The US ‘has put great attention’ on the South China 
Sea issue since the beginning of 21st century (Song 2003, 236). In particular, the 
US Department of State published ‘Limits in the Seas: China’s Maritime Claims in 
the South China Sea’, which unequivocally backed the so-called ‘arbitration of the 
South China Sea’ (Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs 2014). In January 30, 2016, 
the USS Curtis Wilbur, an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer, sailed 
within 12 nautical miles of the Triton Island, part of the Chinese Paracel Islands 
(Ministry of National Defense spokesman YANG Yujun’s speech 2006). On May 
10, the US Navy illegally sent the Lawrence destroyer inside 12 nautical miles of 
Fiery Cross Reef of the Chinese Spratly Islands (Ministry of National Defense 
spokesman YANG Yujun’s speech 2016). On October 20, The USN guided-missile 
destroyer USS Decatur (DDG 73) operated near the territorial sea of the Paracel 
Islands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman HUA Chunying’s speech 2016). 
On March 18, The United States and the Philippines agreed on five locations 
for U. S. military facilities in the Philippines under a security deal, Enhanced 
Defence Cooperation Agreement, the five bases are Basa Air Base, Fort Magsaysay, 
Antonio Bautista Air Base, Lumbia Air Base and Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base. 
In particular, the Antonio Bautista Air Base, situated on Palawan, is in close 
proximity to the ‘disputed’ rocks of South China Sea (Xinhua News 2016). In May, 
2016 President Barack Obama visited Vietnam and announced the United States 
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is lifting a decades-long arms embargo on that country (Xinhua News in Hanoi, 
Vietnam 2016).
2) Japan continues to strengthen defence cooperation with Vietnam and the 
Philippines. Recently, Japan has taken an active part in military exercises in 
the South China Sea, frequently sending ships to this region under the name of 
fighting against piracy, drug smuggling, illegal migration and other trans-border 
crimes (Zeming 2010, 132–148). In February 2015, Gen Nakatani, Japan’s defence 
minister made it clear that ‘the influence of the situation of the South China Sea 
to Japan is growing’ (Huanqiu Military 2015). February 18, 2016, Japan Maritime 
Self-Defence Force and two P-3C Coast Guard vessels conducted exercises 
at a seaport in the Vietnamese city of Da Nang (“Japan and Vietnam’s Navy…” 
2016). In May 28, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe and Vietnamese Prime 
Minister PHAM Xuan Phuc held talks. The two sides reached a consensus on 
strengthening defence cooperation (Kyodo News 2016). On February 29, Japan 
and the Philippines signed a defence equipment transfer agreement, Japan agreed 
to supply the Philippines with military hardware, involving a transfer defence 
technology and equipment (Xinhuanet 2016).
3) The EU’s has increased its involvement. The involvement of the European Union 
in the South China Sea issue is often expressed by the EU institution itself — very 
few countries have made public statements in this issue. However since 2016, 
the situation has changed, several EU countries began to declare their positions. 
In March 2016, the European Union External Action Services (EEAS) urged all 
claimants to resolve disputes through peaceful means, to clarify the basis of their 
claims, and to pursue them in accordance with international law including LOSC 
and its arbitration procedures (Foreign affairs & international relations of Council 
of the European Union 2016). In May, at the occasion of the G7 summit, British 
Prime Minister David Cameron warned China that it must abide by the outcome 
of international arbitration on its increasingly assertive territorial claims in the 
South China Sea (The Guardian 2016). In early June, France’s Defence Minister, 
Jean-Yves Le Drian, told attendees of the Shangri-La Dialogue, that France would 
encourage the European Union to undertake ‘regular and visible’ patrols in the 
area (The Diplomat 2016). One month later, EEAS called all the parties of LOSC 
to settle the maritime dispute through international juridical means and to 
implement the legally-binding Award (Foreign affairs & international relations of 
Council of the European Union 2016).
Moreover, after Modi appointment as prime minister of India in 2014, the Indian 
government changed a ‘Look East’ policy into an ‘Act East’ policy (Kugelman, Vickery 
2014). During Modi’s visit to Washington, India and the US issued a joint declaration 
which pointed out that the South China Sea is of great significance to safeguard mari-
time security and ensure freedom of navigation (Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Regular 
Press Conference 2014). Indian President Pranab Mukherjee also signed an agreement 
for offshore oil exploration with Vietnam just before Modi’s visit to America (Kugelman 
2014, 10).
Impact of Arbitration case on joint development in the South China Sea. Rel-
evant countries’ reaction to the result of arbitration. July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court 
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of Arbitration issued its final ruling on the arbitration case (PCA Press Release). After 
the announcement of the Award, the major powers reacted differently. The United States 
(Assistant Secretary and Department Spokesperson John Kirby 2016), Japan (Arbitration 
between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China regarding the 
South China Sea 2016), Australia (Australia supports peaceful dispute resolution in the 
South China Sea 2016), Canada (Global Affairs Canada, Canadian statement on South 
China Sea Arbitration 2016) reaffirm its recognition for the arbitration. They consider 
that award to be legally binding, and call on both sides to abide by the ruling. Besides, 
the attitude of European Union (Foreign affairs & international relations of Council of 
the European Union 2016) and India (Statement on Award of Arbitral Tribunal on South 
China Sea Under Annexure VII of UNCLOS 2016) is relatively soft: they acknowledge the 
result of arbitration and request all parties to respect the LOSC. The Russia, however, reaf-
firms its support for China, opposes the interference of foreign countries in South China 
Sea affairs and supports a peaceful settlement of dispute (Russia’s Position on the South 
China Sea 2016).
ASEAN countries have a variety of positions. The Philippines are undoubtedly fa-
vourable to the results of the arbitration and focus on the implementation of the arbi-
tration award. Additionally, the Philippines is willing to resume dialogue with China on 
the basis of the arbitration results (Statement of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs 2016). 
Vietnam also welcomed the results of the arbitration, but did not declare its opinion on 
the specific provisions (Remarks of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Vietnam 2016). Singapore (MFA Spokesman’s Comments on the ruling of the Arbitral 
Tribunal in the Philippines v China case 2016), Malaysia (Statement by Malaysia 2016), 
and Myanmar emphasize the rule of law and advocate solving the South China Sea issue 
through diplomatic and legal processes. However, in fact they actually they indirectly sup-
port the arbitration result. Besides, Indonesia and Thailand call for all parties to observe 
“restraint and sobriety” (Press Releases: Statement of Thailand on Peace, Stability and Sus-
tainable Development in the South China Sea 2016). Cambodia throws its support behind 
China and is against the arbitration results (Lin 2016, 33).
The South China Sea Situation after the Sino-Philippine arbitration. The situa-
tion in the South China Sea after the arbitration has had a tendency to become stable, the 
confrontation in this area has declined. This is mainly due to the three following reasons. 
Firstly, China has exercised ‘great restraint’ and not taken countermeasures against the 
results of the arbitration. On the contrary, China made the gesture of promoting regional 
security and mutual trust. Because China ‘disinfected’ the result of arbitration through 
public opinion and diplomatic warfare, and took substantive measures at the relevant sea 
area, so as to maintain stability in the South China Sea temporarily.
Secondly, countries outside the region and major ASEAN countries are worried that 
if they go for further action, China may respond by taking countermeasures. Therefore, 
in addition to the diplomatic battle, there are no concrete measures to execute the imple-
mentation of the arbitration award.
Thirdly, as the principle party in the arbitration, the Philippines, after the change 
of government, showed favourable attitudes toward China, similarly, the latter positively 
responded to the new government.6 The relations between China and the Philippines are 
thus at a turning point.
6 From October 18 to October 22, the president of the Philippines Duterte visited China.
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Negative Impact of the Arbitration Result on the Joint Development of the South 
China Sea. Some negative effects of the Sino-Philippine arbitration award may be re-
flected on joint development in the South China Sea.
1) The South China Sea legal battle will continue, and ‘outsider’ countries, or 
some of the South China Sea claimant countries, are likely to seize the occasion 
to reinforce the results of the arbitration. In the last few years, the distinctive 
features of determining the legal character of the dispute in the South China Sea 
have become clearer (Zewei 2016, 93). Recently the legal status of China’s ‘nine 
dashed-line’ claim has been often challenged by the international community 
(Beckman 2013, 63). For example, Hilary Clinton, the then US Secretary of State 
criticized it at the Security Conference of the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 
2011: We also call on all sides to put forward their claims on the South China 
Sea in a way in accord with the international law. The claims on the South China 
Sea should be legal claims, which rely on the facts of topography and landform 
(Reuters Indonesia 2011). The Philippines also strongly criticized China in this 
conference maintaining that there was no basis in international law for China’s 
claims to the South China Sea (Deutsche Presse News 2011). Meanwhile, Vietnam 
is willing to bring claims before international arbitration (Fuguo, Shicun 2015, 
97). Penghong Cai said: “Even Indonesia believes that the dotted line will affect 
its ‘territorial integrity’ because the dotted line cuts into the Natuna Islands, thus 
more Indonesian troops need to be “stationed” on the islands’ (Penghong 2015). 
Moreover, claimants of the South China Sea would invoke the provisions of the 
LOSC in a narrow sense in favour of them in order to get sympathy and support 
from the international society.
2) China’s maritime claims over the South China Sea will be fragmentized due to 
the results of the arbitration award, the maritime enforcement exercises by China 
is likely to become ‘less and less legitimated’. The Chinese government, for quite 
long time, claims that ‘Chinese activities in the South China Sea date back to over 
2,000 years. China was the first country to discover, name, explore and exploit the 
resources of the South China Sea Islands and the first to continuously exercise 
sovereign powers over them. Therefore, China has indisputable sovereignty over 
the South China Sea Islands. In 1947, China renamed the maritime features of the 
South China Sea Islands and published an official map which displayed a dotted 
line in the South China Sea one year later. Besides, both the Declaration of the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea of 1958 and 
the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone of 1992 expressly provide that the territory of the People’s Republic of China 
includes, among others, the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha 
Islands and the Nansha Islands. All those acts affirm China’s territorial sovereignty 
and relevant maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea” (Zewei 2016). 
However, the arbitral tribunal concluded that China has no legal basis to claim 
“historic rights” to resources in the South China Sea, and it has violated the 
Philippines’ sovereign rights in the disputed waters (PCA Press Release 2016). So 
it can be seen that China will face increasing international pressures caused by the 
result of the arbitration award, moreover, the influence of arbitration would oblige 
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China to protect its sovereignty and legitimate maritime rights over the South 
China Sea in an environment of degraded international public opinion.
3) The result of the arbitral award may further decrease the claimant countries’ 
intention to execute joint development with China in the South China Sea. Before 
the decision of the arbitration, there already exist many sovereign disputes over 
islands and rocks of Spratly Islands, the joint development zone is difficult to 
delimit, so the claimants of South China Sea are unlikely to launch co-development 
with China. Worse still, the result of arbitration unilaterally denies Chinese 
historical claims across the Nine-Dash Line area (PCA Press Release 2016), which 
may lead some of the South China Sea claimants take a more negative attitude 
toward China’s joint development activities for oil and gas resources.
Possibility of Sino-Philippine joint development in the South China Sea. Favour-
able conditions for the Sino-Philippine joint development after the arbitration:
1) China’s willingness to cooperate bilaterally with ASEAN may get stronger. On 
September 7, 2016, the 19th China-ASEAN Leadership Conference and the 25th 
Anniversary Summit of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations is held in Vientiane£¨Laos. 
China and the Heads of State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN issued 
the “Joint Statement of the 19th ASEAN-China Summit to Commemorate the 25th 
Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations：Towards a Closer ASEAN-
China Strategic Partnership” (2016–09–08), “the establishment of the Guidelines for 
Hotline Communications among Senior Officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
of ASEAN Member States and China in Response to Maritime Emergencies in the 
Implementation of the DOC” (2016–09–08), “Joint Statement of Commemorative 
Summit Marking the 25th Anniversary of Bilateral Dialogue Relations” (2016–
09–08), “the Joint Statement between ASEAN and China on Production Capacity 
Cooperation” (2016–09–08) (Official website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Official 
website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016). These documents, on the one hand, 
“stress the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea” 
(Xinhuanet 2016); on the other hand, they ‘reiterate its commitment to regional 
cooperation in East Asia and continue to maintain dialogue and coordination on 
the basis of regional framework’, and assure that it is ‘committed to enhancing the 
ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for mutual benefit’ (Xinhuanet 2016).
2) The recent new development in Sino-Philippine bilateral relations opened up a 
fresh chapter. From October 18 to 21, 2016, the President Duterte of the Philippines 
visited China to ‘normalize and develop the Sino-Philippine relations, and put 
the South China Sea issues back on track of bilateral dialogue and consultation” 
(Chinese Foreign Ministry, 2016). October 21, 2016, “Joint Statement of China 
and the Philippines” was officially released (Joint Statement of China and the 
Philippines 2016). This joint statement reaffirmed that “contentious issues are not 
the sum total of the China-Philippines bilateral relationship. Both sides exchange 
views on the importance of handling the disputes in the South China Sea in an 
appropriate manner….and addressing their territorial and jurisdictional disputes 
by peaceful means” (Joint Statement of China and the Philippines 2016). “Both 
sides agree to continue discussions on confidence-building measures to increase 
mutual trust and confidence and to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of 
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activities in the South China Sea…Both sides also agree to explore other areas of 
cooperation” (Joint Statement of China and the Philippines 2016).
3) China and the Philippines have attempted to develop jointly. In 2012, the oil 
companies of China and the Philippines negotiated the joint development issue 
relevant to the maritime area near Reed Bank. Manuel Pangilinan, chairman and 
chief executive of Philex Petroleum, a Philippine-based oil company, suggested 
that, since the development of the Reed Bank oil and gas resources required the 
enormous support of capital and technology, so he planned to introduce one or 
two foreign partners to participate (Manuel Pangilinan 2016). On October 23, 
2013, the Philippine Energy Minister confirmed that Forum Energy, a British-
Philippine joint venture is negotiating with China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) about the joint exploration of oil and gas resources in 
Reed Bank. He called Pangilinan, the chairman of the Philex Petroleum, to adopt 
a commercial agreement with the Chinese oil companies so as to pave the way 
for the exploration of Reed Bank, which is still in dispute (Energy Minister of the 
Philippines recalls Pangilinan 2014). The Reed Bank, however, is the focus of a 
Sino-Philippine territorial dispute. China believes that Reed Bank is located in the 
northeast of Chinese Spratly Islands and within the scope of the ‘Nine-Dash Line’, 
which belongs to inherent Chinese territory. Meanwhile, the Philippines are in 
de facto control of the Reed Bank. Therefore, the attempt of Sino-Philippine joint 
development near this maritime area did not prove successful (Jinming 2015, 84).
Adverse conditions. As mentioned above, although Sino-Philippine relations have 
been restored and developed after the arbitration, there still exist some unfavourable fac-
tors that may affect joint development in the South China Sea. For example, the result of 
the arbitration will have a long-term negative impact on relations between the two coun-
tries; besides, the governance capability of president Duterte remains to be seen. There are 
still some uncertainties in the prospects of the development of Sino-Philippine relations.
To sum up, although the current Sino-Philippine relations have been fully restored 
and developed, there is still a very small possibility for the two countries to develop the oil 
and gas resources in the South China Sea jointly.
Possibility of Sino-Philippine joint development on marine fisheries. Although 
the field of marine joint development is mainly based on oil and gas resources exploita-
tion, in recent years, however, some international practices reflected that the domain of 
joint development extended gradually to other domains such as biological resources and 
marine tourism (Zewei 2014, 72). In fact, in order to promote the optimized utilization 
of living marine resources, LOSC attaches great importance to its joint development. For 
instance, article 123 of LOSC explicitly provides that States bordering enclosed or semi-
enclosed seas “shall endeavor, directly or through an appropriate regional organization, 
to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living 
resources of the sea”. In addition, there are a number of joint development practices on 
marine biological resources in the international community. Such as Australia and Pap-
ua New Guinea’s practice, in 1978, the two countries signed the Torres Strait Treaty to 
establish protection area and to jointly develop the fishery resources (Burmester 1982, 
321–349).
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Therefore, in the context of the improvement of bilateral relations between China 
and the Philippines, it is probable that the two countries will launch the fisheries joint de-
velopment program near Huangyan Island in the South China Sea. The cooperation may 
include fishing, aquaculture, and other activities.
It’s worth noting that, since the visit of Philippine President Duterte in China, the 
fishing activities around the Huangyan Island have not been blocked by Chinese Maritime 
law enforcement ships (Xuan 2016).7
China’s choice: with which country is China most likely to execute a pilot-joint 
development in the South China Sea? As mentioned above, the stable development of 
China’s relations with ASEAN and its member states has created favourable conditions 
for joint development between China and other countries with claims in the South China 
Sea. It is indeed that China keeps good bilateral relations with Vietnam, Malaysia and 
Brunei, both sides expressed ‘the common will to jointly develop in the South China Sea’. 
Moreover, there already exist joint development practices between Vietnam, Malaysia and 
Brunei. Even so, due to the islands’ sovereignty dispute that China has with Vietnam, Ma-
laysia and Brunei in the Spratly Islands, China is unlikely to engage in joint development 
with these three countries in the South China Sea. On the contrary, it is Indonesia with 
whom China is most likely to carry out leading joint development activity in the South 
China Sea.
Possibility of joint development between China and Indonesia in the Natuna wa-
ters. The favorable conditions that China and Indonesia execute joint development are 
mainly in the following four aspects:
1) A good relationship exists between China and Indonesia. Since the establishment 
of diplomatic relations between China and Indonesia, after years of rapid 
development, the cooperation between two countries has been fully developed, 
both horizontally and vertically. Especially after President Xi’s visit to Indonesia 
in October 2013, the bilateral relationship between China and Indonesia has been 
upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership (China-Indonesia relationship 
has been upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership 2013). As a result, 
Sino-Indonesia relations have become one of the most important, dynamic and 
potential bilateral relationships between China and ASEAN countries. From the 
economic perspective, in 2013, the volume of Sino-Indonesia’s trade amounted 
to 52.45 billion US dollars. Of this, Indonesia’s exports to China were 22.6 billion 
US dollars, which amounted to 12.4% of Indonesia’s total exports. Indonesia 
imported from China 29.85  billion US dollars, occupying 16% of Indonesia’s 
total imports. China has become Indonesia’s largest import country and the 
second largest export market after Japan. At present, the security cooperation 
mechanism between China and Indonesia is ahead of that among all the Sino-
Southeast Asia security cooperation, such as China anti-terrorism special forces 
in joint training with Indonesia, joint production of missiles, bilateral defence 
7 According to the information of Reuters and other media, on October 28, 2016, the spokesman for 
the Philippine President declared that, the Philippines observed that there are not the Chinese maritime 
police ships around the waters of Huangyan Island. In addition, the Associated Press also said that, on 
October 30, 2016, the Philippine Defense Minister Lorenzana said that, aerial inspection showed that, 
although there are still at least four Chinese maritime police ships remain near the waters of Huangyan 
Island, but they no longer restraint the Philippine fishermen from the fishing in the relevant waters. 
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and security consultations, bilateral maritime security agreements, bilateral 
naval dialogue and so forth. In 2015, the 65th anniversary of the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between China and Indonesia and the 60th anniversary of the 
Bandung Conference, have further developed its bilateral relations. In the future, 
the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ proposed by China, will surely include 
Indonesia, the largest archipelago country in Southeast Asia, thus make Indonesia 
an important hub for “One Road” cooperation. At the same time, Indonesia’s six 
corridor construction plan will benefit from it.
2) There is no island sovereignty dispute between China and Indonesia. In the view of 
the current international practices, the majority of joint development is executed 
in the overlapping area without territorial sovereignty disputes (Zewei 2016, 99). 
Many scholars also believe that the prerequisite for joint development should be 
the resolution of the sovereignty conflict of the relevant islands (Jianguo 2006, 
209). Therefore, the island sovereignty disputes that China has with Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei affected negatively the advancement of joint 
development. Between China and Indonesia, however, an island sovereignty 
dispute does not exist. Rather, they share 50,000 square kilometers’ of overlapping 
maritime area in the South China Sea. Besides, Indonesia has repeatedly claimed 
that it is not party to the islands’ sovereignty dispute of the South China Sea, but 
will take efforts to promote the settlement of disputes by diplomatic means and 
continue to play the role of ‘mediator’ (Huiyi 2010).
3) Indonesia has the practice of joint development with other countries. In 
December 1989, Indonesia and Australia signed the Treaty between Australia 
and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Co-operation in an Area between the 
Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia (11 December 1989). 
The two countries delimitated a joint development “block” and carried out the 
relevant activities (International Law Material 1990, 469–537). Particularly, in 
this case Indonesia insisted the 200-mile continental shelf claim, which could 
help determine the overlapping area between China and Indonesia in the Natuna 
waters. In addition, if China and Indonesia launch the joint development in the 
Natuna waters in future, much can be learned from the experience of Indonesia 
and Australian relations over their fairly large sea areas. These resulted in dividing 
the joint development zone into three parts respectively, and applied a different 
development mechanism (Fox 1990, 129).
4) Natuna contains rich natural gas resources (Valencia, Masahiro 1985, 231–233; 
Valencia 1986, 681–683). Some information shows that the Natuna gas field of two 
countries overlapping area in the southern of the South China Sea reserves about 
1.31  trillion cubic meters’ volume, which is one of the world’s largest gas fields 
(Jinzhe 2002, 113). This makes it practicable to exploit oil and gas resources in the 
joint development blocks, designated by the two countries in the future.
How to promote joint exploitation of China and Indonesia in Natuna sea area? 
Promoting Chinese and Indonesian joint development in the Natuna waters can proceed 
from the following aspects:
1) Let us appropriately use the successful Indonesia-Australia joint development 
case for reference. In 1989, the two countries co-elaborated the activities blocks, 
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the joint development institutions and the relevant applicable laws including the 
content of dispute settlement, and so on (International Law Material 1990, 469–
537). Not only was the joint development regime very detailed, but also rather 
scientific, and thus had a more important value for reference (Moloney 1990, 273). 
First of all, the content of the joint development agreement between China and 
Indonesia can also provide more details. Secondly, in terms of the delimitation 
of a joint development zone, the two countries also designated three blocks, A, 
B, C , of which Zone A was the core development zone that was jointly managed 
and equally shared the benefits of the two countries; Zone B is under Chinese 
jurisdiction, but China has to share some of the proceeds with Indonesia; Zone 
C is under the jurisdiction of Indonesia, which contrarily has to share part of the 
proceeds with China. Finally, the joint administration of the joint development, 
namely the Common authority, can also be given a relatively more powers by the 
two countries.
2) Focusing on the symbolic meaning and its influence of Sino-Indonesia joint 
development in the Natuna waters. In “Timor-Leste v. Australia” joint development 
case, Australia made many concessions to make Timor-Leste to approve the joint 
development agreement as soon as possible. On the one hand, most of the benefits 
that Australia obtains from the petroleum exploitation it will give up to Timor-
Leste; On the other hand, Australia agreed that the joint development commission 
could be mainly managed by Timor-Leste. If in the Joint Commission Timor-
Leste appoints one more member than Australia, the designated authority would 
be taken by the domestic entity of Timor-Leste (Ong 2002, 80–100). Contrarily, 
the concessions that Australia has made are on the condition that Timor-Leste 
ratify the joint development agreement at first, because the implementation of the 
agreement can not only ensure the stability of the Timor Sea, so as to ensure the 
continuation of Australia’s existing oil projects; but also can achieve Australia’s 
political and economic interests. In fact, China is also facing similar problems of 
joint development in the South China Sea. Therefore, in the joint development 
negotiations between two countries, it is possible that the two parties take 
appropriate concessions, and make fully use of the joint development program in 
Natuna waters, this case can be also seen as a symbolic example. 
3) Indonesia could be considered as a logistical support base of two countries’ joint 
development. Natuna is about 1,900 kilometers from mainland China. At present, 
Indonesia has built a natural gas pipeline from West Natuna to Singapore and 
Malaysia. Therefore, if Natuna Waters can be served as the logistics support 
base for the joint development, both two sides can use Indonesia’s existing oil 
and gas processing and other infrastructure, to facilitate the joint development. 
Furthermore, cooperation is economically feasible because of the close distance, 
and rapid logistical support, which may have the largest economic benefits. 
3. Conclusion. The joint development in the South China Sea after the Sino-Philip-
pine arbitration are facing new challenges and opportunities, from this study we can draw 
the following conclusions.
The choice of ‘block’ for maritime joint development does not affect the delimita-
tion of maritime boundary. The articles 74 and 83 of LOSC provides that, before reaching 
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an agreement, ‘the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall 
make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during 
this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement.’ It 
can be seen from this ‘no harm clause’ that, as a type of provisional arrangement, maritime 
joint development activities, including the choice of ‘blocks’, do not affect the delimitation 
of maritime boundaries (Lagoni 1984, 359; Becker-Weinberg 2014, 204). As one scholar 
has pointed out, ‘Although joint development zones may be regarded as substitution of 
border, but it’s not necessarily do that; in most international practices, joint development 
is at least initially regarded as a provisional measure’ (Armstrong, Forbes 1998, 356). For 
example, in the ‘Nigeria and Sao-Tome and Principe joint development case’, a treaty 
concluded in 2001  provides that ‘nothing contained in this Treaty shall be interpreted 
as a renunciation of any right or claim relating to the whole or any part of the Zone by 
either State Party or as recognition of the other State Party’s position with regard to any 
right or claim to the Zone or any part thereof ’ (Art. 4 Treaty between the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome 2001). In 2002 the ‘Australia and 
Timor-Leste Joint Development’ case, the two countries concluded the Timor Sea Treaty 
between the Government of East Timor and the Government of Australia, which provides 
that the treaty don’t execute any prejudice to each party’s position on delimitation of 
the permanent continental shelf of the Joint Petroleum Development Zone (Timor Sea 
Treaty between the Government of East Timor and the Government of Australia 2002). 
In addition, in 1997 Thailand and Vietnam signed a maritime delimitation agreement, 
but the two countries still continue to carry out the joint development activities in the 
‘block’ zone (Hong Thao 2003, 148). Therefore, in the negotiation of the ‘block’ choice, 
it is necessary to firstly put forward the ‘no damage clause’, and lead the people of the 
respective nations to correctly understand the nature of the maritime joint development. 
This may not only contribute to the designation of the joint development ‘block’, but is 
also favourable to the smooth implementation of joint development.
Existence of a disputed sea area helps to delimit the maritime joint development 
‘block’. As mentioned above, the recognition of disputed sea areas is a prerequisite for de-
limiting and developing the joint exploitation ‘block’. However, if one or both sides are not 
clear and definite in their maritime claims, it will become very difficult to define the spe-
cific scope of maritime delimitation disputes, thus make it impossible to identify potential 
maritime joint development ‘block’. At the same time, in this situation, the international 
oil companies are reluctant to take risks or to invest in the its relevant joint development 
activities, because the legal status of this area is ambiguous (Hong Thao 2003, 148). There-
fore, to some extent, further clarifying China’s claims in the South China Sea and explicitly 
defining the disputed sea area between China and relevant countries will undoubtedly 
help to delimit the maritime joint development “block”.
There is a no ‘no gain no win’ principle for maritime joint development arrange-
ments. As a provisional arrangement, the maritime joint development activities contrib-
ute to ease or even eliminate tensions between the two countries and help to enhance 
mutual trust (Beckman et al 2013, 329). In fact, the choice of the ‘block’, the signature of 
joint development agreement, are both based on the recognition of each other’s claims 
that have legitimacy to some certain extent, it’s also the result of mutual compromise, 
therefore, an absolute “no winner or loser” principle does not exist (Fox 1990, 122; Beck-
man 2013, 307). For example, in the 2001 Nigeria-Sao Tome and Principe Joint Develop-
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ment case, although Nigeria obtained 60#% proceeds of the joint development zone, it has 
to undertake some social development projects for Sao-Tome and Principe. On the con-
trary, despite the fact that Sao-Tome can only share 40#% of the proceeds, it has achieved 
its objective to participate in joint development management. Moreover, this brings the 
OPL246 area into the joint development ‘block’. This is regarded as a huge prospect and 
has a license to Exxon Mobil Oil Company issued by Nigeria (Art. 3 Treaty between the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome 2001). Another 
example is the 2002 “Australia and Timor-Leste joint development case”, although the Aus-
tralia made greater concessions to Timor-Leste in the proportion of oil revenue from joint 
development zone (Timor-Leste obtains 90#%), but the “downstream” business that Aus-
tralia responsible for is also quite lucrative.
Maritime joint development cannot be done at one go. The choice of a joint de-
velopment “block”, the conclusion of agreement and its implementation, are all related to 
national interests, which usually take a long and difficult time. For example, in the “Malay-
sia-Thailand Joint Development” case, from the signature of the Memorandum of Under-
standing on Joint Development in 1979, to the formal launch of activities in 1994, it took 
nearly 15 years for the two countries to realise joint development. The agreement on joint 
operation itself took 4 years, not to mention another 11 years spent to sign “the agreement 
to constitute the joint authority and other affairs” of the memorandum of understanding. 
Besides, in the “Australia and Timor-Leste” case, although the period for establishing the 
cooperation zone is much faster than in the “Malaysia-Thailand” case, it still took almost 
20 years from the implementation of the memorandum to actual operation. Therefore, 
if China wants to launch joint development activities with the relevant countries in the 
South China Sea, it might do well to have enough patience and mental preparation for 
multiple negotiations.
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